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Abstract:  The contingent claims analysis of the firm financing often presents a debt 
renegotiation game with a passive bank which does not use strategically its capability 
to force liquidation, contrary to what is observed in practice. The first purpose of this 
paper is to introduce more strategic bank behaviour into the continuous-time model 
developed by Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997) and Hackbarth, Hennessy, and 
Leland (2007). Its second purpose is to account for variations in the information 
obtained by the parties during the contract period. We show that with public 
information and private debt only, the optimal probability of debt renegotiation is fixed 
by the firm’s anticipated liquidation value. When we add public debt and asymmetric 
information, the good-type firm may be tempted to mimic the bad-type to reduce its 
debt service. We show that to deter such mimicking, banks may sometimes refuse to 
renegotiate with strong firms having a low liquidation value. Our results are in line 
with the empirical observation that recovery rate at emergence of bankruptcy is 
function of the share of private debt in all the firm’s debt and is relatively low. 
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Résumé: L’analyse contingente du financement des entreprises présente souvent un 
jeu de renégociation de la dette avec une banque passive qui n’emploie pas 
stratégiquement ses possibilités de forcer la liquidation, contrairement à ce qui est 
observé dans la pratique. Le premier but de ce document est de présenter un 
comportement plus stratégique de la banque dans le modèle développé par Mella-
Barral et Perraudin (1997) et Hackbarth, Hennessy, et Leland (2007). Son deuxième 
but est de prendre en compte l’asymétrie dans l’information obtenue par les parties 
au cours du temps. Nous montrons qu’avec information publique et dette privée 
seulement, la probabilité optimale de renégociation de la dette est fixée par la valeur 
anticipée de liquidation de l’entreprise. Quand nous ajoutons de la dette publique et 
une information asymétrique, le bon type d’entreprise (forte valeur de liquidation) 
peut être tenté d’imiter le mauvais type pour réduire son service de la dette. Nous 
montrons que pour décourager une telle imitation, les banque vont parfois refuser de 
renégocier avec les sociétés ayant une valeur de liquidation faible. Nos résultats sont 
en conformité avec l’observation empirique que le taux de recouvrement au moment 
de la faillite est fonction de la part de la dette bancaire dans la dette totale de 
l’entreprise et que ce taux est relativement bas. 
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1 Introduction
There are many contributions on contingent claims analysis that propose elegant
models for the financing of the firm, but they fail to fit important facts observed in fi-
nancial markets. For example, the Anderson-and-Sundaresan (1996, AS) as well as the
Mella-Barral-and-Parraudin (1997, MP) models of costless debt renegotiation never
obtain (inefficient) liquidations at equilibrium, whereas such liquidations do occur
in many markets even after renegotiation.1 Moreover, in these models, private debt
holders always renegotiate, while, in practice, banks may decide not to renegotiate.
The borrower who relies exclusively on bank debt always avoids costly bankruptcy. It
would seem that the setting of the bankruptcy game is not broad enough to introduce
the bank’s capacity for strategic renegotiation and liquidation, since the passive bank
always agrees to renegotiate (Anderson, Sundaresan, and Tychon, 1996).
Hackbarth, Hennessy, and Leland (2007, HHL) propose a renegotiation game, similar
to that of MP, with take-it or leave-it offers from the strong firm that has full bargain-
ing power in the process of restructuring private debt. In this type of renegotiation,
the bank has no incentive to declare the strong firm in default. The authors use this
framework to explain the mix of markets versus non-market debt and the specifica-
tion of debt priority. This is the first trade-off-theory contribution on debt structure
to analyze the effect of bargaining power on the optimal debt mix. They show that
introducing market debt distorts bilateral bargaining between the bank and the firm,
inducing inefficient bankruptcies. By doing so they can reconcile debt-structure the-
ory with some but not all of the empirical facts, since banks liquidate strong firms in
many markets or countries. In fact, their model cannot explain the empirical result
that recovery rate at emergence of bankruptcy is related to the share of private debt
in the total firm’s debt (Carey and Gordy, 2007, and Hamilton and Carty, 1999.)
In HHL, inefficient liquidations are explained by the presence of public debt. Public
debt introduces inefficient bankruptcies, since the parties fail to internalize the pos-
itive externality accruing to lenders when the bank grants interest rate concessions.
Public debt complements the private debt capacity by providing tax-shield benefits
exceeding those attainable with bank debt alone. Since public debt introduces bank-
ruptcy costs or inefficient bankruptcies, the optimal debt structure implies equalizing
the marginal bankruptcy cost linked to market debt with the marginal tax benefits,
as in the trade-off literature (Leland, 1994).
HHL focus on a parsimonious pricing model featuring a tax-shield/bankruptcy-cost
tradeoff. The model approximates the situation facing large and mature corporations
that are likely to be in a strong bargaining position ex post. Banks always accept the
firm’s renegotiation offer and never liquidate strong firms armed with renegotiation
1See also Fan and Sundaresan (2000) for a model of strategic interactions between debtholders
and equity-holders that accommodates varying bargaining powers.
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power. One consequence of their model where banks are flexible (or not strategic
enough) is that renegotiation limits the firm’s capacity to borrow private funds. This
explains why strong firms must raise significant debt capital via public debt to increase
their benefits from all potential tax shields. Finally, as in Mella-Barral and Perraudin
(1997), banks always renegotiate, no matter how the information on the debt contract
conditions evolves over time: A scenario which does not necessarily correspond to the
reality. Indeed, the firm may be better informed than the bank at the renegotiation
date.
The first purpose of this paper is to introduce more strategic bank behavior into
the continuous-time model developed by MP and HHL. Its second purpose is to
account for variations in the information obtained by the contractual parties during
the contract period. The bank can indeed refuse to renegotiate private debt with
a given probability (mixed strategy, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) resulting in early
liquidation of firms as is observed in the banking credit activity. Moreover, we consider
that, during the contractual period, the strong firm may be in a position to assess
its true value more readily than the bank. So there may be asymmetric information
between the strong firm and the bank at the contract renegotiation date.
In our framework the strong firm is always the leader and the bank plays a mixed
strategy where it may refuse the renegotiation proposal from the strong firm with a
probability q. In absence of renegotiation, it will liquidate the firm immediately. We
derive the values of the different claims on the firm depending on the bank’s mixed
strategy using an extended zero-coupon approach. Interestingly, the firm and the
stock values (and the public debt value, if any) exhibit a jump at the renegotiation
threshold, either downward (the firm is liquidated) or upward (the bank agreed to
renegotiate the debt service). Our main results are summarized in Table 1 where
BD stands for Bourgeon and Dionne. We first show, in the pure exogenous private
debt framework of AS and MP, that the mixed strategy increases the value of the
bank debt. In that first case (BD1), we obtain that the bank never renegotiates at
equilibrium (q∗ = 1), so inefficient bankruptcies can be observed with only private
exogenous debt.
However, when the level of debt is endogenous, the more strategic bank has to account
for the fact that the firm may react to the risk of liquidation by reducing its debt level.
Hence, the bank may prefer to have the reputation of accepting to renegotiate under
certain circumstances (q∗ < 1). A high probability of debt renegotiation reduces the
firm’s private (bank) debt capacity but a low probability increases the liquidation rate.
So the strong firm faces the usual tax-benefit/bankruptcy-cost tradeoff even in the
absence of public debt. In fact, in this second case (BD2), we show that the optimal
probability of debt renegotiation depends on the firm’s anticipated liquidation value
or its anticipated Loss Given Default (LGD) in the bankruptcy state, for a given
tax rate (see Basel Committee, 2005, for the definition of LGD.) High LGDs (higher
than a threshold determined by the tax rate) or low liquidation values eliminate
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Contribution Bank strategy
and market environ-
ment
Probability of
renegotiation
refusal
Private debt ca-
pacity
MP
AS
Non-strategic
Private debt only
q∗ = 0 Exogenous
BD1
Lemma 2
Strategic
Private and public
debt
q∗ = 1 Exogenous
BD2
Proposition 4
Strategic
Private debt only
q∗ = 0 with
low LGD
q∗ = 1 with
high LGD
Minimal
Higher
HHL Non-Strategic
Private and public
debt
q∗ = 0 Minimal
BD3
Proposition 5
Strategic
Private and public
debt
q∗ = 0 Minimal
BD4
Proposition 6
Private information,
strategic, private and
public debt or private
debt only
q∗ = 0 with
low LGD
q∗ > 0 with
high LGD
Endogeneous
The first column identifies the contributions: MP is for Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), AS for Anderson and
Sudaresan (1996), HHL for Hackbarth, Hennessy and Leland (2007) and BD for Bourgeon-Dionne. The second
column identifies the different cases analyzed while the third and fourth columns summarize the main results in
terms of renegotiation probability and private debt capacity. The first two lines show how introducing more strategic
behavior on the part of the bank affects the renegotiation probabilities when private debt is exogenous. The third line
shows that, in presence of endogenous private debt, the introduction of more strategic behavior on the bank’s part
determines the optimal renegotiation probability as a function of the anticipated LGD. The two following lines show
how the presence of public debt eliminates inefficient liquidation in the presence of perfect information. The last line
reintroduces inefficient liquidation by considering asymmetric information on firm’s value at the renegotiation date.
Table 1: Summary of Results.
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renegotiation possibility because they correspond to low debt values. Hence, when
the resale value of the firm’s assets is low, the firm has no incentive to renegotiate
because it would be forced into liquidation. So the bank is able to increase the debt
capacity of the firm that has a low anticipated liquidation value or a high LGD. It is
well known that LGDs vary in function of economic cycles and debt seniority (Gupton
et al., 2000; Schuermann, 2004): LGD increases in time of recession and decreases
as debt seniority increases. So our contribution explains why banks renegotiate more
often in expansion cycles and more often when they are senior. This also explains the
variation of private debt capacity in function of anticipated LGD.
Case BD2 considers only private debt. Once the bank has agreed to renegotiate,
the firm never goes bankrupt. This is not the case in HHL where public debt is
not renegotiable which allows the firm to increase the total debt value, and thus its
total debt capacity. We also investigate this case assuming that the bank is strategic
and we show that with public debt, the strategic bank always renegotiates (q∗ = 0,
BD3) at the renegotiation date under public information. This result corresponds
to the assumption of a passive bank as supposed by HHL. So HHL do not have to
assume that the bank is flexible to obtain their optimal debt structure under public
information.
In the following section we introduce asymmetric information on the LGD value at the
renegotiation date in order to explain why banks do not renegotiate with the strong
firm under certain circumstances, as observed in many economies. We consider private
and public debt. At the date of debt emission (when the bank and the firm agree on
the private debt level), the bank and the firm do not know the LGD value, so both use
the ex ante expected value that set the anticipated ex post renegotiation possibility.
After the signature of the debt contract, the firm learns its private LGD while the
bank does not observe it, so there is asymmetric information on this parameter at
the renegotiation stage. Two scenarios are considered and they are discussed with
respect to the BD2 case. When we consider an economy where the tax rate is high
enough to obtain q∗ = 1 and a corresponding high debt capacity, the bank has no
incentive to fix a q∗ lower than one for any firm type because this would reduce debt
value, and thus the firm’s debt capacity. However, when the tax rate is sufficiently
low, the bank may find it beneficial to use a self-selection mechanism to separate the
firm types and increase its debt capacity. We show that a liquidation probability q∗
strictly between zero and one for the bad-type (lower liquidation value) allows the
bank to deter the good-type from mimicking the bad-type in order to obtain better
renegotiation conditions (sooner and with a lower debt service).
When we add public debt, the information asymmetry is still a problem for the bank.
Indeed, in the presence of public debt, bad-type firms are liquidated later than good-
type ones. Hence, the risk of being liquidated is not a deterrent for the good-type
firms and, in general, the presence of asymmetric information implies that the bank
will not always renegotiate with strong firms having a high LGD or a low liquidation
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value (BD4). Our model can be used to explain the variation of the recovery rate
on face value (R) (Scho¨nbucher, 2003) as a function of the private debt share in the
firm’s debt. Indeed, we obtain that R is increasing in the share of private debt, a
result consistent with the recent empirical literature (Carey and Gordy, 2007).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we extend the EBIT
continuous-time model of Goldstein, Ju and Leland (2001) to the case of a bank’s
mixed strategy and show how strategic denial affects equity and debt values with
exogenous private debt. In section 3, we derive the optimal bank strategy with en-
dogenous private debt and public debt. Section 4 introduces asymmetric information
on LGD and discusses the empirical implications of our results. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model with bank’s mixed strategy
In this section, we extend the model developed by Mella-Baral and Perraudin (1997) in
order to introduce a more strategic bank behavior at the renegotiation stage. Consider
a firm contemplating investment in a project with date-t EBIT flow starting from a0
and following the geometric Brownian motion
dat/at = δdt+ σdWt,
where drift δ and volatility σ are constant over time, and Wt is a standard Brownian
motion. With r the default-free interest rate, the expected net value (before tax)
of the firm’s assets at date t is given by at/µ where µ = r − δ corresponds to the
expected gross earnings rate.
In order to undertake this investment project, the firm must raise external funds. The
structure of the financial underpinning of the venture depends on the expected tax
benefits associated with debt and on the characteristics of the different debts the firm
may issue. We reckon that the firm may issue two classes of perpetual debt: Private-
bank debt and public-market debt. Compared to the public debt, which cannot be
renegotiated unless bankruptcy is declared, the bank debt can be renegotiated in the
course of a costless private workout.2 In the following, we shall consider the two cases
of a firm that has (does not have) access to public debt. We assume that the bank is
senior, which means that the full liquidation value is paid to the bank.
When the firm renegotiates, say, once the EBIT flow has plummeted to aR, the
threshold that triggers default and negotiation, we suppose that the strong firm can
2There are several reasons (in addition to administrative or legal requirements) why public debt
cannot be renegotiated outside the formal bankruptcy process: firstly, coordination costs for widely
dispersed creditors are likely to be prohibitive (Hart and Moore, 1995.) Secondly, there is the free-
riding problem: Hoping that the other creditors will concede a reduction in their debt payments, it
is tempting to refuse to renegotiate one’s own (see HHL for a longer discussion).
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make take-it-or-leave-it offers of a reduced debt service to the bank. As the bank can
always liquidate the firm and resell its assets, the firm’s offer must at least match this
resale value which is given by γat/µ at any date t, where 1 > γ > 0. Denoting by
BDP the value of the bank debt once the bank has agreed to renegotiate, any offer
to the bank must satisfy
BDP (a) ≥ γa/µ (1)
for all a ∈ [aL, aE], where aL corresponds to the threshold that triggers liquidation
and aE the EBIT flow level that ends the reduced debt service period, aE ≥ aR.
In fact, (1 − γ)aL/µ can be interpreted as the product of the LGD×EAD, where
LGD=1− γ corresponds to the loss given default and EAD=aL/µ is the exposure at
default. Hence, a period of reduced debt service begins when a falls to aR and lasts
until a climbs to aE or falls to aL, in which case the firm is liquidated. Obviously,
if shareholders know that the bank always agrees to any offer that satisfies (1), this
condition is binding for all a ∈ [aL, aE]. The debt service is thus given by
s(a) =
{
γa a ∈ (aL, aE]
b a > aE
(2)
where γa corresponds to the reduced debt service proposed by the firm to the bank
once the firm’s revenue falls to aR, leading to a debt value equal to γa/µ for all
a ∈ (aL, aE].
However, satisfaction of (1) does not guarantee that the bank will always agree to
renegotiate. Suppose instead that the bank adopts a mixed strategy, i.e., it accepts
any renegotiation offer that satisfies (1) with probability 1 − q and liquidates the
firm with probability q whatever the offer. The bank’s expected revenue at the time
of renegotiation still corresponds to the liquidation value of the firm’s assets, but
shareholders take the risk of losing the firm if it defaults. As shown below, accounting
for the possibility that the bank may liquidate the defaulting firm gives a situation
which differs significantly from the one where the bank always agrees to an offer that
satisfies (1). To detail these effects, it is useful to derive the value of zero-coupon
contingent claims that are exercised only at a given probability.
Consider first Zˆt, the current value of a zero-coupon claim that pays $1 with probabil-
ity 1 should the asset flow fall to a given threshold aL < a0, and is worthless afterward.
Assuming financial market equilibrium under risk neutrality, it must satisfy
rZˆt = Et[dZˆt/dt]|dt=0. (3)
As Zˆt depends on t through at only, we can write Zˆt = Z(at) and using Itoˆ’s lemma,
rewrite (3) as
rZ(a) = aδZ ′(a) + σ2a2Z ′′(a)/2. (4)
The general solution of this second-order linear differential equation is given by
Z(a) = K1a
β +K2/a
α (5)
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where β and α are two positive parameters satisfying Q(−α) = Q(β) = 0 with
Q(x) = x[δ + (x− 1)σ2/2]− r, (6)
and K1 and K2 are two constants determined by boundary conditions. A first con-
dition, called the “value matching condition,” comes from the very definition of the
claim which must pay $1 should the asset flow fall down to aL. We thus must have
Z(aL) = 1. The second one, the so-called “no-bubbles in asset prices condition,”
requires that the value of this contingent claim must tend to 0 when the value of the
firm’s assets is very large, since the prospect of reaching aL is low. We thus must have
lima→+∞ Z(a) = 0, which implies that K1 = 0 in (5). From the condition Z(aL) = 1,
we then get K2 = a
α
L. Consequently, (5) reduces to
Z(a) = (aL/a)
α (7)
for all a ≥ aL. Consider now the two contingent claims A and P with values and
instantaneous rewards denoted by Zk and zk respectively, k = A,P , and satisfying
3
zA(a, x, y) =
{
0 a > aR
qx+ (1− q)ZP (a, x, y) a = aR
and
zP (a, x, y) =

ZA(aE, x, y) a = aE
0 a ∈ (aL, aE)
y a = aL
where aE ≥ aR > aL and q ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, A and P are zero-coupon claims but with
probability q, A pays x when a falls to threshold aR (a passage from above) and is
worthless afterward, and with probability 1− q it pays nothing but is transformed to
claim P . This latter pays y at the first passage of a to aL from above and is worthless
afterward, or is converted back to claim A at the first passage of a to aE from below,
whichever event occurs first.
Over their relevant supports, (aR,+∞) for claim A and (aL, aE) for claim P , the
values of these claims must satisfy (4) and thus expressions similar to (5). Observing
that for q = 0 we must have ZP (a, x, y) = ZA(a, x, y) for all a ∈ [aR, aE], and using
the “no-bubbles” condition lima→+∞ ZA(a) = 0, it is easy to obtain that the values
of these claims satisfy
ZA(a, x, y) =
{
K/aα a > aR
qx+ (1− q)ZP (aR, x, y) a = aR
and
ZP (a, x, y) =

ZA(aE, x, y) a = aE
q(K1a
β +K2/a
α) + (1− q)K/aα a ∈ (aL, aE)
y a = aL
3Throughout the paper, A and P are mnemonics for ex ante (before renegotiation) and ex post
(once renegotiation is agreed by the bank) respectively.
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where the constants K, K1 and K2 are determined by the value matching conditions
ZP (a
−
E, x, y) = ZA(aE, x, y), ZA(a
+
R, x, y) = ZA(aR, x, y) and ZP (aL, x, y) = y. This
leads to the following result
Proposition 1 The value of the zero-coupon contingent claims A and P are given
by
ZA(a, x, y) = ω(aL)x(aR/a)
α + [1− ω(aL)]y(aL/a)α a ≥ aR, (8)
and
ZP (a, x, y) = y(aL/a)
α− [ω(aL)−ω(a)] {y(aL/a)α − x(aR/a)α} a ∈ [aL, aE], (9)
where
ω(a) =
q(aα+βE − aα+β)
q(aα+βE − aα+βL ) + (1− q)(aα+βE − aα+βR )
a ∈ [aL, aE].
Proof: See the appendix.
ZA given by (8) is the weighted sum of the values of two simple contingent claims,
the first one paying x when a reaches aR (the x-claim) and the second paying y
when a reaches aL (the y-claim), with respective weights ω(aL) and 1−ω(aL). Using
aE ≥ aR > aL, one can verify that ω(aL) > q when q ∈ (0, 1), hence the weight on
the x-claim is greater than the probability q that A effectively pays up x at the first
passage of a through aR. This is due to the fact that a may cross aR several times
whereas it can cross aL only once. ω(aL) corresponds to the corrected probability
of pocketing x and accounts for the fact that once a has crossed aR and claim A is
transformed to claim P , a has to exceed aE before P is converted back to A. ZP
given by (9) also involves a weighted sum of the same two simple claim values. We
have
ZP (a, x, y)− ZA(a, x, y) = ω(a) [yaαL − xaαR] /aαL
for all a ∈ [aR, aE], and thus ZP > ZA if xaαR < yaαL, i.e., when the value of the
x-claim is lower than the value of the y-claim. This case is depicted in Figure 1.
Because ω(a) is decreasing, ZP is lower than the value of the y-claim for all a > aL.
The term
ω(aL)− ω(a) = q(a
α+β − aα+βL )
q(aα+βE − aα+βL ) + (1− q)(aα+βE − aα+βR )
corresponds to the corrected probability of pocketing x given a < aE and accounts
for the fact that, if the earnings flow crosses threshold aE, contingent claim P is
converted to A, and thus may yield x the next time a falls to aR.
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2.1 Strategic denial and claim values
We can now analyze the effects of the bank’s mixed strategy on the values of the
different claims on the firm. As the probability of liquidating the firm is given by
q whatever the shareholders’ offer, (1) holds as an equality during the renegotiation
period. Hence, the bank debt can be considered as a contingent claim that pays
coupon b as long as the firm continues to operate, yielding the scrap value of the firm’s
assets at the time of liquidation. The value of the bank debt before renegotiation is
thus given by
BDA(a) = b/r − [b/r − γaL/µ](aL/a)α.
The value of the bank debt contains two terms: The face value of the debt, i.e. the
discounted value of the coupon flow b/r and the option value associated with the
irreversible decision to liquidate the firm and sell its assets. This latter term involves
the difference between the discounted value of the coupon flow which the bank loses
in case of bankruptcy, and the resale value of the firm’s assets at liquidation threshold
aL. This liquidation revenue is discounted by (aL/a)
α, the current value of a zero-
coupon claim that pays $1 should the asset value fall to aL.
Denote by c the perpetual coupon of the market debt. Assuming that the full liqui-
dation value is paid to the bank and that this value is lower than the face value of
the bank debt, i.e. b/r ≤ γaR/µ, the value of the market debt is given by
MDk(a) = c/r − Zk(a, c/r, c/r)
where k = A,P. With effective tax rate τ , the value of the firm is given by4
Vk(a) = (1− τ)a/µ+ τ [BDk(a) +MDk(a)]− [DBCk(a) + IBCk(a)],
k = A,P , where DBC and IBC denote direct and indirect bankruptcy costs re-
spectively. DBC corresponds to the loss due to the liquidation of the firm’s assets,
while IBC is the loss of the tax-sheltering value of interest payments. More pre-
cisely, DBC is equivalent to a security that pays no coupon but has a value equal to
(1 − τ − γ)a˜/µ should bankruptcy occur when the assets flow falls to a˜ ∈ {aL, aR}.
Bankruptcy is triggered with probability 1 when a˜ = aL and with probability q when
a˜ = aR. Hence, this security is equivalent to the mix of the two contingent claims A
and P investigated above, with x = (1 − τ − γ)aR and y = (1 − τ − γ)aL, and we
have5
DBCk(a) = Zk(a, aR, aL)(1− τ − γ)/µ
4The effective tax rate τ is a compound deduced from the tax rate on corporate profits τc and the
tax rate on dividends τd following the relation τ = 1− (1− τc)(1− τd). To simplify the presentation,
we do not consider interest income taxes.
5According to Graham’s (2000) results, τc = 31% and τd = 10%, which gives τ = 38%. So, to
obtain 1− τ − γ ≥ 0, γ must be lower than 62%, which is a reasonable upper value for γ. See Miao
(2005) for other useful parameter values.
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k = A,P . Indirect bankruptcy costs correspond to the tax benefits that are lost once
the firm is liquidated. Should liquidation occur when EBIT reaches a˜, these losses
are given by τγa˜/µ. We thus have
IBCk(a) = Zk(a, aR, aL)τγ/µ
k = A,P . The total bankruptcy costs, the sum of the DBCk(a) and the IBCk(a),
are given by (1− τ)BCk(a) where
BCk(a) = Zk(a, aR, aL)(1− γ)/µ.
The value of the firm is thus given by
Vk(a) = (1− τ)[a/µ−BCk(a)] + τ [BDk(a) +MDk(a)].
The value of equity is deduced from the firm value by
Sk(a) = Vk(a)− [BDk(a) +MDk(a)]
= (1− τ)[a/µ−BCk(a)−BDk(a)−MDk(a)].
The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 2 When the bank liquidates a defaulting firm with probability q ∈ (0, 1)
whatever the offer of reduced debt service, the equity, debt, and firm values are given
by
SA(a) = (1− τ){a/µ− (c+ b)/r + [b/r − γaR/µ] (aR/a)α − ZA[a, g(aR), g(aL)]}
BDA(a) = b/r − [b/r − γaR/µ] (aR/a)α
MDA(a) = c/r − ZA(a, c/r, c/r)
VA(a) = (1− τ){a/µ− c/r − ZA[a, g(aR), g(aL)]}
+τ{(c+ b)/r − [b/r − γaR/µ] (aR/a)α + ZA(a, c/r, c/r)}
(10)
before renegotiation (where a ≥ aR), and by
SP (a) = (1− τ){g(a)− ZP [a, g(aR), g(aL)]}
BDP (a) = γa/µ
MDP (a) = c/r − ZP (a, c/r, c/r)
VP (a) = (1− τ){a/µ− c/r − ZP [a, g(aR), g(aL)]}
+τ{γa/µ+ c/r − ZP (a, c/r, c/r)}
(11)
if the bank agrees to renegotiate and until either liquidation or return to normal debt
service (a ∈ (aL, aE)), where
g(a) = (1− γ)a/µ− c/r. (12)
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(12) corresponds to the expected value of the equity before tax once the bank has
agreed to renegotiate when the EBIT flow is equal to a. It is equal to the value
of the firm’s asset, a/µ, minus the amounts corresponding to the renegotiated debt
service γa/µ and to the public debt c/r. The ex post value of equity given by (11) also
accounts for the liquidation option ZP [a, g(aR), g(aL)] that must also be removed from
g(a) and the tax payments. The ex ante value of equity given by (10) presents two
option values: The option to renegotiate the debt-service, which brings in b/r−γaR/µ
in the event the asset flow falls to aR and the option ZA[a, g(aR), g(aL)] to liquidate
which is only partly under shareholders’ control, because the bank may refuse to
renegotiate and force liquidation at aR. Using ZP (aL, x, y) = y, one can verify that
we have SP (aL) = MDP (aL) = 0. Also, since the bank only agrees with probability
(1− q) to any renegotiation offer and liquidates the firm with probability q, we must
have SA(aR) = (1 − q)SP (aR) and MDA(aR) = (1 − q)MDP (aR). This is easily
verified using the expressions given in (10) and (11). Indeed, as
ZA[aR, x, y] = qx+ (1− q)ZP [aR, x, y]
we have
SA(aR) = (1− τ){g(aR)− ZA[a, g(aR), g(aL)]}
= (1− τ)(1− q){g(aR)− ZP [aR, g(aR), g(aL)]}
= (1− q)SP (aR)
and
MDA(aR) = c/r[1− ZA(aR, 1, 1)] = c/r(1− q)[1− ZP (aR, 1, 1)] = (1− q)MDP (aR).
As a consequence, with q > 0, we have SA(aR) < SP (aR) andMDA(aR) < MDP (aR).
Graphically, we observe in Figure 2 a jump at aR from SA(aR) to SP (aR). This is not
the case when the debt service resumes to plain coupon b, i.e. when a has climbed
to aE, and we have SP (aE) = SA(aE) and MDA(aE) =MDP (aE). Observe also that
the firm’s value satisfies
VP (a)− VA(a) = ZA[a, g(aR), g(aL)]− ZP [a, g(aR), g(aL)]
= ω(a) {g(aR)aαR − g(aL)aαL} /aα > 0
for all a ∈ [aR, aE]. Hence, the firm’s value still benefits from the agreement once the
firm has (partly) recovered. Since ω(a) is decreasing, this benefit diminishes when
the value of the assets increases, and we have VP (aE) = VA(aE).
2.2 Renegotiation and liquidation thresholds
To completely specify the claim values, it remains to determine the thresholds aE,
aR and aL. Let us first discuss threshold aE, which triggers the end of the reduced
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debt service. Contrary to the renegotiation and liquidation thresholds aR and aL,
which are optimally determined by the firm, aE is constrained by the possibility that
the bank has to liquidate the firm. Indeed, once the bank has agreed to the reduced
debt service, we have b/r − [b/r − γaR/µ] (aR/a)α > γa/µ as long as a belongs to
(aR, aE), meaning that with a normal debt service, the value of the debt would be
greater than the resale value of the firm, which is also the current value of the debt.
But for a > aE, the bank would be better-off liquidating the firm than receiving
the normal debt service b, i.e., b/r − [b/r − γaR/µ] (aR/a)α < γa/µ. Threshold aE
is thus given by BDA(aE) = γaE/µ. The bank debt values are depicted in Figure
3. Observe that, contrary to the equity value, there is no jump at aR since we have
BDA(aR) = BDP (aR).
Thresholds aR and aL are optimally chosen by the firm and thus maximize SA and SP
given in (10) and (11). Equivalently, these thresholds must satisfy the smooth-pasting
conditions
S ′A(a
+
R) = (1− q)S ′P (aR) (13)
S ′P (aL) = 0 (14)
which can be written as
∂ZP
∂a
[aL, g(aR), g(aL)] = g
′(aL), (15)
and
∂ZA
∂a
[aR, g(aR), g(aL)] = qg
′(aR) + (1− q)∂ZP
∂a
[aR, g(aR), g(aL)] (16)
− [αb/r − (1 + α)γaR/µ] /aR
using (10) and (11). Using ∂ZA/∂a = −αZA/a and ∂ZP/∂a = −αZP/a+ω′(a) {yaαL − xaαR} /aα,
(15) and (16) lead to the following result
Lemma 1 Optimal thresholds aL and aR satisfy
g′(aL) + αg(aL)/aL = ω′(aL) {g(aL)aαL − g(aR)aαR} /aαL (17)
when aL > 0, and
αb
aRr
−(1+α)γ
µ
−q
[
g′(aR) + α
g(aR)
aR
]
= (1−q)ω′(aR) {g(aL)aαL − g(aR)aαR} /aαR. (18)
To interpret (17) and (18), consider the two extreme cases q = 1 (the bank refuses
any renegotiation offer and always liquidates the firm) and q = 0 (the bank always
agrees to renegotiate). The LHS of (17) reflects the effect of a marginal increase in
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aL on the value of the liquidation option. When q = 0, the RHS (17) is equal to 0,
and the optimal liquidation threshold is given by
aC = µ
α
1 + α
c/r
1− γ (19)
which is equivalent to condition (32) in HHL when interest income tax is nil. Hence
the firm is liquidated when the expected value of the firm’s assets, aC/µ, is lower than
the break-even level c/[r(1− γ)] given the face value of the (non-renegotiable) public
debt, c/r: Given the low resale value of the firm’s assets during the renegotiation
period, it is optimal to let the firm operate below its break-even level in the hope
that recovery will occur. With q > 0, as aC maximizes g(a)a
α and ω′(a) < 0 for all
a, (17) implies aL > aC . This early liquidation rule is due to the fact that, if the
firm recovers sufficiently to come back to a normal debt service, it may be forced
into liquidation the next time it defaults; thus it is not worthwhile to wait until
a reaches aC . This is the effect reflected by the RHS of (17), where ω
′(aL) is the
marginal decrease in the probability the firm will be liquidated at aR in place of aL,
and g(aR)a
α
R− g(aL)aαL the corresponding loss. When q = 1, liquidation occurs when
the firm defaults and we have aR = aL. Liquidation rule (17) is then not relevant,
but (18) allows us to determine the optimal liquidation threshold, given by
aB =
α
1 + α
c+ b
r
µ. (20)
This result can be directly obtained observing that we have ZA[a, g(aR), g(aL)] =
g(aL)(aL/a)
α when q = 1, which corresponds to the value of another liquidation
option. Hence, in that case, the firm possesses only a liquidation option, equal to
[(c+ b)/r − aL/µ] (aL/a)α, which is maximized at aL = aB given by (20). More
generally, the LHS of (18) corresponds to the effect of a marginal increase in aR on
the value of the sum of the renegotiation and liquidation options, the latter being
weighted by q, i.e., [b/r − γaR/µ − qg(aR)]aαR. Denote by T (q) the threshold that
maximizes this sum, i.e.,
T (q) =
α
1 + α
(qc+ b)/r
γ + q(1− γ)µ. (21)
Hence, (21) would be the optimal renegotiation threshold were the RHS of (18) nil.
This term corresponds to the marginal increase in the loss of liquidating the firm at
aR in the future assuming that the bank agrees to renegotiate today. As this term is
positive, we have aR ≤ T (q). Of course, when q = 0, the renegotiation threshold is
at its maximum level, given by a¯ = T (0).6 The next proposition summarizes these
results.
6The reader can verify that we have T ′(q) < 0 when b/c > γ/(1 − γ), which we assume in this
section. Observe that if b/c < γ/(1− γ), the liquidation threshold is greater than the renegotiation
threshold when q = 0, meaning that the bank debt is so small than the firm would not even bother
renegotiating its private debt, even though the bank always agrees to do so.
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Proposition 3 When the bank liquidates a defaulting firm with probability q ∈ (0, 1)
whatever the offer made by the firm, we have aL > aC and aR < T (q).
It is easy to see from (10) that the bank debt decreases with the renegotiation thresh-
old (we have dBDA(a)/daR < 0 if aR < T (0), which is always the case). For a given
coupon b, as aR decreases with q (indeed, on can verify using T (q) as a proxy for aR,
that we have T ′(q) < 0 provided c/b < (1 − γ)/γ), the bank would be better-off if
it had a reputation of never accepting to renegotiate the debt service with the firm.
This is formally stated in the following lemma
Lemma 2 For a given coupon b, the bank debt is maximum when q = 1.
Obviously, this is not the whole story: If the bank has the reputation of never rene-
gotiating, it may end up with a relatively low coupon b and finally with a low debt
value. Hence, when determining its renegotiation strategy, the bank has to consider
the effect of its reputation on the firm’s demand for private and public funds. This
is the question that we discuss in the following section.
3 Capital structure and the choice of q.
To investigate the question of optimal leverage, let us first consider the case without
public debt. As c = 0, the optimal liquidation threshold is aL = 0. The optimal debt
level maximizes the value of the leveraged firm, a choice made at t = 0, the period of
the borrowing agreement. Ultimately, this problem comes down to determining the
value of the coupon, b, anticipating that the firm will eventually renegotiate the debt
service should the asset flow fall to the optimally chosen threshold aR. Consequently,
the optimal coupon b satisfies the following condition7
τ
{
∂BD(a0; b, aR)
∂b
+
∂BD(a0; b, aR)
∂aR
daR
db
}
− (1− τ)∂BC(a0; aR)
∂aR
daR
db
= 0 (22)
As shown above, the problem of determining the optimal renegotiation threshold is
equivalent to maximizing the (weighted) sum of the renegotiation and liquidation
options. This can also be written as maxaR S(a; b, aR), leading to the condition
∂BD(a; b, aR)
∂aR
+
∂BC(a; aR)
∂aR
= 0 (23)
7With a slight abuse of notation.
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which holds for all a ≥ aR. Plugging (23) in (22) allows us to simplify the latter to
τ
∂BD(a0; b, aR)
∂b
= −∂BD(a0; b, aR)
∂aR
daR
db
(24)
Using q as a proxy for ω, (23) gives8
aR =
α
1 + α
µ
γ + q(1− γ)
b
r
(25)
which can also be derived from (21) by setting c = 0. Use of (24) allows us to obtain
aR = a0
(
1 +
αq(1− γ)
τ [γ + q(1− γ)]
)−1/α
. (26)
When q = 0, we have aR = a0 = a¯, leading to an optimal debt level equal to γa0/µ:
As observed by HHL, the firm is constrained by the debt capacity, which is equal
to the resale value of its assets at the time of emission. Hence, the firm will try to
renegotiate the debt service as soon as the contract has been signed. When q > 0,
we have a0 > aR and, more generally, one can derived from (26) that aR decreases
when q increases. Straightforward computations allow us to obtain that the firm and
the debt values at t = 0 are given by
V0(q) =
a0
µ
{
1− τ + [τγ + q(τ + α)(1− γ)]
[
aR
a0
]1+α}
(27)
and
BD0(q) =
a0
µ
[γ + q(1 + α)(1− γ)/τ ]
[
aR
a0
]1+α
. (28)
It is shown in the appendix that V0(q) is a convex function of q, and more precisely
that V ′0(q) > 0 iff
q > q¯ ≡ γ(1− τ)
(1− γ)(τ + α) .
Hence, starting form q = 0, the firm’s value first diminishes until q reaches q¯, and
then increases as q increases. This is generally also the case for the debt value since
we have BD′0(0) = 0 and BD
′
0(q) > 0 for q > 0 if
q >
γ(1− 2τ)
(1− γ)(τ + α) ,
8Whereas T (q) is an upper bound for aR which is reached only when q = 1 or q = 0, simulations
show that T (q) constitutes a good proxy for aR for intermediate values of q. More generally, we
will replace ω(a`) by q and use T (q) (and aC) as the optimal renegotiation (liquidation) threshold
to demonstrate our results in the following.
16
a condition that is satisfied for all q > 0 when τ > 1/2. In that case, BD0(0) is
a minimum, and the debt value increases with q. For lower tax rates (and more
reasonable ones, see footnote 5), i.e. τ < 1/2, BD0(0) is a local maximum. Hence,
we can expect that the optimal probability level for debtholders and shareholders is
either q = 0 or q = 1. It is demonstrated in the appendix that we have V0(1) > V0(0)
if
τ > τ¯ ≡ α(1− γ)γ
1/α
1− γ1/α (29)
which also ensures that BD0(1) > BD0(0). We can thus claim that
Proposition 4 When the firm does not have access to public debt, both shareholders
and the bank expected revenues are maximum at q = 1 when γ is low (LGD is high).
The intuition of this result is the following. In the situation where the bank always
agrees to renegotiate the debt service, an increase in the debt level allows an increase
in the firm’s value without affecting bankruptcy costs. It is thus optimal to have as
much debt as possible in order to benefit from the tax-shield. However, the firm’s
debt capacity is relatively small because the bank expects the firm to renegotiate
the debt service frequently. By credibly committing to liquidate the firm in the
event shareholders decide to default, the bank deters the firm from renegotiating
prematurely. This increases the debt value for a given coupon. Expecting this,
shareholders could then reduce the debt level. However, the bank’s strategy is also
beneficial to shareholders when γ is low: It allows the firm to increase its debt capacity.
The strategy is thus optimal for both the bank and the firm.
Let us now consider the case with private and public debt. Similar computations (see
Proof of Proposition 5 in the appendix) show that the optimal renegotiation threshold
is still given by (26) and that the optimal liquidation threshold satisfies
aL = a0
[
τ
τ + α
]1/α
. (30)
The optimal level of (total) debt at t = 0 can be written as
TD0(q) =
a0
µ
{
γ
(
aR
a0
)1+α
+
(1 + α)(1− γ)
τ
[
q
(
aR
a0
)1+α
+ (1− q)
(
aL
a0
)1+α]}
(31)
and thus contains an additional term compared to (28) which is decreasing when q
increases. As a result, we have TD′0(q) < 0 for all q: The higher the probability the
bank will refuse to renegotiate, the lower the debt value. The value of the firm, given
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by
V0(q) =
a0
µ
{
1− τ + τγ
(
aR
a0
)1+α
+ (1− γ)(τ + α)
[
q
(
aR
a0
)1+α
+ (1− q)
(
aL
a0
)1+α]}
(32)
also exhibits a similar additional term compared to (27). It is shown in the appendix
that V0(q) is also generally convex but, more importantly, that V0(0) > V0(q) for all
q > 0. Hence we have the following result
Proposition 5 With public debt, the firm value is maximum for q = 0.
This result is easily understood: Without public debt the bank can increase the debt
capacity of firms with a high LGD by liquidating systematically a defaulting firm.
However, this is exactly the situation that a firm faces if it has only issued public
debt. Hence, when there is already public debt, the only valuable contribution from
a bank is offering the firm a renegotiable debt. So, our result is similar to HHL in
the presence of public debt, even when we allow a more strategic behavior.
4 Asymmetric information on LGD
The previous section showed that the bank follows an unambiguous decision rule
regarding the liquidation of the firm (we either have q = 1 when LGD is large and the
firm has no public debt, or q = 0 in the other cases). However, if q = 0 is optimal when
the bank has perfect information about the LGD of the firm, this may not always
be the case when the information on LGD is not equally shared by debtholders and
equity-holders. We investigate this question in this section and we show how a strictly
positive value of q may explain the observed recovery rates.
4.1 Renegotiation strategy under asymmetric information
Suppose that at t = 0 (the date debt is issued), neither the firm nor the bank and the
financial markets know the exact value of γ. They all know that γ can take two values,
γ¯ and γ with 1 > γ¯ > γ > 0, and the probability of either case. So, all parties use E[γ]
when debt is issued. Suppose then that the firm learns its γ only after the emission of
debt and that this information is not public. When the bank’s strategy is always to
renegotiate (i.e. q(γ) = q(γ¯) = 0), γ¯-type firms may be tempted to renegotiate their
debt with the bank as a γ-type firm would. Indeed, the corresponding debt service
is lower (γa compared to γ¯a) and renegotiation occurs earlier (using (21) we have
aR(γ) > aR(γ¯)). Besides, as (19) indicates, we have aL(γ) < aL(γ¯) and thus γ¯-type
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firms do not face the risk of being liquidated prematurely. To avoid such behavior,
the bank may threaten to liquidate firms with probability q whenever they try to
renegotiate at aR(γ). We first investigate this question by considering first the case
c = 0, i.e., firms only have private debt. In that case, we have aL(γ) = aL(γ¯) = 0.
Of course, the asymmetric information problem is relevant in that case only if the
optimal perfect information strategy for the bank is to always agree to renegotiate
the debt whatever γ, which corresponds to a situation where γ is high enough (low
LGD and/or low tax rate).9
At aR(γ), the stock value of a γ¯-type firm that decides to renegotiate the debt like a
γ-type firm is equal to
S(aR(γ); γ, γ¯) = (1− τ)[1− q(γ)](1− γ)aR(γ)/µ,
i.e., the stock value of a γ-type firm, which accounts for the risk that the firm will be
liquidated by the bank with probability q(γ). The firm is deterred from mimicking a
γ-type firm if S(aR(γ); γ, γ¯) ≤ S(aR(γ); γ¯, γ¯), i.e. if
[1− q(γ)](1− γ)aR(γ)
µ
≤ aR(γ)
µ
− b
r
+
[
b
r
− γ¯aR(γ¯)
µ
] [
aR(γ¯)
aR(γ)
]α
.
Using aR(γ¯)/µ = αb/[rγ¯(1 + α)] and
aR(γ) =
α
1 + α
µ
γ + q(γ)(1− γ)
b
r
,
we obtain that we must have aR(γ¯) ≥ aR(γ), which leads to
q(γ) ≥ γ¯ − γ
1− γ > 0. (33)
It is shown in the appendix (Proof of Proposition 6) that if firms have issued both
public and private debts, it is still necessary to liquidate γ-type firms with a strictly
positive probability to deter γ¯-type firms from mimicking γ-type. Indeed, with q(γ) =
q(γ¯) = 0, we have aL(γ) < aL(γ¯) and thus γ¯-type firms extract from the information
asymmetry an additional advantage: Once the private debt has been renegotiated
with the low service flow of a γ-type firm, they are able to put off liquidation longer
than they otherwise could. Hence, public debt does not help to mitigate the private
information problem. We thus have the following result
Proposition 6 With asymmetric information on γ, the γ¯-type firm is deterred from
mimicking the γ-type firm only if the probability of liquidating the γ-type firm is
sufficiently high. This result holds with or without public debt.
9In the other case, we have q(γ) = 1 and the firm is immediately liquidated.
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Consequently, in order to discipline γ¯-type firms, the bank must refuse to renegotiate
with γ-type firms with a strictly positive probability. If the bank chooses to do so
(i.e., if the fraction of γ¯-type firms is large) and if there is only private debt, then
condition (33) is binding. Hence, both types of firms approach the bank at the same
time (when at reaches aR(γ¯) = aR(γ)), but γ-type firms ask for a lower debt service
than γ¯-type firms and take the risk of being liquidated. The renegotiation offer of a
γ¯-type firm, which corresponds to an higher debt service, is always accepted by the
bank.
4.2 Recovery rate on firm’s total debt
Following Carey and Gordy (2007), one can compute the recovery rate on the total
debt face value when the bank forces the liquidation of the firm with probability
q > 0. We have
R =
γaR/µ
(c+ b)/r
=
α
1 + α
γ
γ + q(1− γ)
qc+ b
c+ b
(34)
using (21). It is interesting to observe that R is increasing in b as tested empirically
by Carey and Gordy (2007). When the bank is less strategic as in HHL, i.e., when
q ≡ 0, R becomes
R =
α
1 + α
1
1− γ
c
c+ b
(35)
using (19), which is decreasing in b. When q ≡ 0, the bank always agrees to rene-
gotiate and liquidation never occurs at renegotiation. Liquidation only occurs when
shareholders decide to stop refinancing the firm’s losses. When q > 0, bankruptcy
may occur at renegotiation since this is the bank’s choice to do so. Here, the bank
has more incentive to liquidate the firm having a low liquidation value. This behavior
is also in line with the empirical result that observed recovery rates are lower than
those predicted by the structural model in absence of asymmetric information.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we present a debt renegotiation model where the bank adopts a more
strategic approach than in the previous literature. As shown by Hackbarth, Hennessy,
and Leland (2007), optimal debt structure is linked to whether it is firms or debt-
holders that control ex post bargaining power. In this paper, we assign the debt
renegotiation power to strong firms but also allow banks to bargain more strategically.
This research is motivated by the empirical observation that banks do not always
renegotiate and that costly bankruptcies are observed in many markets or countries.
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The paper’s main results call for discussion regarding the information available
on the firm’s value at the renegotiation date. We limit this discussion to the more
general environment, where the private debt capacity is endogenous. When both
parties have the same information and if there is no public debt, we show that the
more strategic bank does not always renegotiate with the firm. This behavior makes
it possible to increase the private debt capacity. In the presence of public debt, the
bank will always renegotiate, seeing that the firm can turn to other sources of funding
to increase its total debt capacity.
If, at the renegotiation date, the information on the firm’s liquidation value
is asymmetrically distributed between the bank and the firm, the results will be less
dependent on the presence of public debt. We show that, to deter firms to renegotiate
their debt services at level lower than their perfect information level, the bank will
not always accept the renegotiation proposal. We also verify that the recovery rate
on the firm’s total debt face value is increasing in the share of private debt in total
debt, a result that cannot be obtained when the bank is less strategic.
Our contribution can be extended in several directions. We discuss two of them
here. The explicit consideration of ex ante asymmetric information can be an impor-
tant ingredient in the detailed analysis of the optimal debt structure. In this research
we are limited to asymmetric information at the renegotiation stage, but asymmetric
information can also be present when the debt is first negotiated. As a rule, banks
and private-market debt issuers use risk classification (credit ratings) when issuing
debt. This reduces the ex ante information gap but does not eliminate it, so there is
still room for renegotiation under asymmetric information at the renegotiation date.
One rationale for ex ante risk classification is the high cost of obtaining information
on all the firms that need external financing. It is therefore probably optimal to wait
for an opportunity to renegotiate with a subset of firms with financial difficulties, so
as to reduce the total information cost. But the whole picture may be more com-
plicated because credit ratings may affect capital structure (Kisgen, 2006, Bourgeon
and Dionne, 2007).
Another extension would be to do an empirical analysis of how differences in
bankruptcy laws affect debt structure. Various studies have undertaken empirical
measurements of market reactions to financial distress in different legislative settings
(Gutie´rrez, Ollala and Olmo, 2005). They report that the valuation of firms’ securities
will depend on the bankruptcy laws applicable in the country where it is actually done.
These regulations can be interpreted so as to assign the renegotiation power either
to debt-holders (creditor protection) or to shareholders (shareholder protection). It
would be interesting to document how these different bankruptcy regimes treat the
ex ante acquisition of information and how they redistribute the renegotiation power
between debt-holders and shareholders under asymmetric information.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Using ZP (a
−
E, x, y) = ZA(aE, x, y), we get K2 = K −K1aα+βE , and thus ZP simplifies
to
ZP (a, x, y) =

ZA(aE, x, y) a = aE
[K − qK1(aα+βE − aα+β)]/aα a ∈ (aL, aE)
y a = aL
Condition ZA(a
+
R, x, y) = ZA(aR, x, y) leads to
K = xaαR + (1− q)K1(aα+βR − aα+βE )
while ZP (aL, x, y) = y implies
K = yaαL − qK1(aα+βL − aα+βE )
Identifying and rearranging terms, we come to
K1 =
xaαR − yaαL
q(aα+βE − aα+βL ) + (1− q)(aα+βE − aα+βR )
and
K =
q(aα+βE − aα+βL )xaαR + (1− q)(aα+βE − aα+βR )yaαL
q(aα+βE − aα+βL ) + (1− q)(aα+βE − aα+βR )
= [1− ω(aL)]yaαL + ω(aL)xaαR
We also have
q(aα+βE − aα+β)K1 = ω(a)(xaαR − yaαL)
and thus
K − qK1(aα+βE − aα+β) = [1− ω(aL)]yaαL + ω(aL)xaαR − ω(a)(xaαR − yaαL)
= yaαL − [ω(aL)− ω(a)] [yaαL − xaαR]
which gives ZP .
B Proof of Proposition 4
Using (28), we have BD0(0) < BD0(1) if
γ < [(aR/a0)|q=1]1+α [(1 + α)(1− γ)/τ + γ]
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which can also be written as
τγ + (1 + α)(1− γ)
τ
[(aR/a0)|q=1]1+α > γ
Using
τγ + (1 + α)(1− γ) = τ + α(1− γ) + (1− γ)(1− τ)
> τ + α(1− γ)
and
[(aR/a0)|q=1]α = τ
τ + α(1− γ) ,
a sufficient condition for BD0(0) < BD0(1) is thus given by
τ
τ + α(1− γ) ≥ γ
1/α
hence τ ≥ τ¯ defined in (29). Differentiating (28), we obtain
BD′0(q) =
a0
µ
[q(1 + α)(1− γ)/τ + γ] (1 + α)
[
aR
a0
]α
d
dq
[
aR
a0
]
+
a0
µ
(1 + α)(1− γ)/τ
[
aR
a0
]1+α
where, using (25),
d
dq
[
aR
a0
]
=
−τ(1− γ)γ
[τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α)]2
[
aR
a0
]1−α
(36)
Consequently
BD′0(q) = q
aR
µ
(1 + α)(1− γ)2 q(1− γ)(τ + α)− γ(1− 2τ)
[τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α)]2 ,
and we have BD′0(0) = 0 and BD
′
0(q) > 0 for q > 0 if
q >
γ(1− 2τ)
(τ + α)(1− γ) .
Hence, if τ > 1/2, BD0(0) is a minimum. Otherwise, for τ < 1/2, BD0(0) is a local
maximum. Similarly, using (27), we have
V0(1)− V0(0) = a0
µ
{
[(aR/a0)|q=1]1+α [τ + α(1− γ)]− τγ
}
=
a0
µ
τ {(aR/a0)|q=1 − γ}
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and V0(1) > V0(0) if τ > τ¯ . As
V ′0(q) =
aR
µ
τ(1− γ)q(1− γ)(τ + α)− (1− τ)γ
τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α)
we have V ′0(q) > 0 iff
q >
(1− τ)γ
(1− γ)(τ + α) .
C Proof of Proposition 5
The optimal ex post choices of the firm satisfy
∂BC
∂aR
+
∂BD
∂aR
+
∂MD
∂aR
= 0 (37)
and
∂BC
∂aL
+
∂MD
∂aL
= 0 (38)
while the optimal ex ante choices of the firm satisfy
τ
{
∂BD
∂b
+
[
∂BD
∂aR
+
∂MD
∂aR
]
daR
db
}
− (1− τ)∂BC
∂aR
daR
db
= 0 (39)
and
τ
{
∂MD
∂c
+
∂MD
∂aL
daL
dc
+
[
∂BD
∂aR
+
∂MD
∂aR
]
daR
dc
}
−(1−τ)
[
∂BC
∂aR
daR
dc
+
∂BC
∂aL
daL
dc
]
= 0
(40)
Substituting, we get
τ
∂BD
∂b
+
[
∂BD
∂aR
+
∂MD
∂aR
]
daR
db
= 0
and
τ
{
∂MD
∂c
− ∂BD
∂b
daR
dc
/
daR
db
}
+
∂MD
∂aL
daL
dc
= 0
Solving for aL and aR gives (26) and (30). Using (19) and (21), we thus have
c
r
=
a0
µ
1 + α
α
(1− γ)
[
τ
τ + α
]1/α
and
b
r
=
a0
µ
1 + α
α
{
τ 1/α[γ + q(1− γ)]1+1/α
[τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α)]1/α − q(1− γ)
[
τ
τ + α
]1/α}
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Defining
TD0(q) ≡ BD0(q) +MD0(q)
=
(
b
r
+ q
c
r
)[
1−
(
aR
a0
)α]
+ γ
aR
µ
(
aR
a0
)α
+ (1− q)c
r
[
1−
(
aL
a0
)α]
where
b
r
+ q
c
r
=
1 + α
α
aR
µ
[γ + q(1− γ)]
and
c
r
[
1−
(
aL
a0
)α]
=
a0
µ
1 + α
τ
(1− γ)
(
aL
a0
)1+α
we arrive at
TD0(q) =
a0
µ
(
aR
a0
)1+α{
1 + α
α
[γ + q(1− γ)]
[(
a0
aR
)α
− 1
]
+ γ
}
+(1− q)a0
µ
1 + α
τ
(1− γ)
(
aL
a0
)1+α
Rearranging terms gives (31). Differentiating, we have
TD′0(q) = −
a0
µ
(1 + α)(1− γ)
τ
{
aR
a0
τγ[(1 + α)q(1− γ) + τγ]
τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α) +
(
aL
a0
)1+α}
< 0.
The value of the firm is given by
V0(q) = (1− τ)
[
a0
µ
−BC0(q)
]
+ τTD0(q)
where
BC0(q) = (1− γ){q(aR/a0)αaR/µ+ (1− q)(aL/a)α0aL/µ}
= (1− γ)a0
µ
{
q
(
aR
a0
)1+α
+ (1− q)
(
aL
a0
)1+α}
which gives (32). Using (36), we arrive at
V ′0(q) =
a0
µ
(1−γ)τ
{[
τ [γ + q(1− γ)]
τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α)
]1/α
q(1− γ)(τ + α)− (1− τ)γ
τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α) −
[
τ
τ + α
]1/α}
We have V ′0(q) > 0 if φ(q) > ψ(q) where
φ(q) ≡ q(1− γ)(τ + α)− (1− τ)γ
τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α)
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and
ψ(q) ≡
[
τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α)
(τ + α)[γ + q(1− γ)]
]1/α
As φ(0) < 0 < ψ(0) and
ψ′(q) =
αγ
(τ + α)2[γ + q(1− γ)]2 <
γ
[τγ + q(1− γ)(τ + α)]2 = φ
′(q)
if there exits q¯ > 0 such that φ(q¯) = ψ(q¯) we have V ′0(q) < 0 iff q < q¯. Hence, V0(q)
reaches its minimum at q¯ ≤ 1 with q¯ < 1 if φ(1) > ψ(1). As
φ(1) =
(1− γ)(τ + α)− (1− τ)γ
τγ + (1− γ)(τ + α) = 1−
γ
τγ + (1− γ)(τ + α)
and
ψ(1) =
[
τγ + (1− γ)(τ + α)
τ + α
]1/α
=
[
1− αγ
τ + α
]1/α
we may have q¯ < 1 if α is large. In any case, it suffices that V0(0) > V0(1) to have
q = 0 optimal. As we have
V0(1) =
a0
µ
{
1− τ +
(
τ
τ + α(1− γ)
) 1+α
α
[(1− γ)(τ + α) + τγ]
}
=
a0
µ
{
1− τ
{
1−
[
τ
τ + α(1− γ)
] 1
α
}}
and
V0(0) =
a0
µ
{
1− τ + τγ + (1− γ)(τ + α)
(
aL
a0
)1+α}
=
a0
µ
{
1− τ(1− γ)
{
1−
[
τ
τ + α
] 1
α
}}
,
we have V0(0) > V0(1) if
(1− γ)
{
1−
[
τ
τ + α
] 1
α
}
< 1−
[
τ
τ + α(1− γ)
] 1
α
hence if γ > ξ(γ) where
ξ(γ) ≡
[
τ
τ+α(1−γ)
] 1
α − [ τ
τ+α
] 1
α
1− [ τ
τ+α
] 1
α
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As ξ(0) = 0, ξ(1) = 1 with
ξ′(γ) =
τ
1
α
{1− [ τ
τ+α
] 1
α}[τ + α(1− γ)] 1α+1
> 0
and ξ′′(γ) > 0, we have γ > ξ(γ) for all γ ∈ (0, 1) and thus q = 0 is optimal.
D Proof of Proposition 6
The result is directly derived from the text in the case with private debt only. If
the firm has issued both public and private debts, the equity value of a γ¯-type firm
mimicking a γ-type firm is given by
S(aR(γ); γ, γ¯) = (1− τ)[1− q(γ)]
{
(1− γ)aR(γ)
µ
− c
r
−
[
(1− γ)aL(γ)
µ
− c
r
] [
aL(γ)
aR(γ)
]α}
= S(aR(γ); γ, γ).
Observe that as S(aR(γ); γ¯, γ¯) > 0, the γ¯-type firm is deterred from mimicking the
γ-type one when q(γ) = 1. More generally, the incentive condition, S(aR(γ); γ, γ¯) ≤
S(aR(γ); γ¯, γ¯), can be written as
[1− q(γ)]
{
(1− γ)aR(γ)
µ
− c
r
−
[
(1− γ)aL(γ)
µ
− c
r
] [
aL(γ)
aR(γ)
]α}
≤ aR(γ)
µ
− b+ c
r
+
[
b
r
− γ¯aR(γ¯)
µ
] [
aR(γ¯)
aR(γ)
]α
+
[
c
r
− (1− γ¯)aL(γ¯)
µ
] [
aL(γ¯)
aR(γ)
]α
which simplifies to
[aR(γ¯)]
α ≥ [aR(γ)]α + c
b
{
q(γ)
[
aR(γ)
]α
+ [1− q(γ)] [aL(γ)]α − [aL(γ¯)]α} (41)
using aL(γ)/µ = αc/[(1 + α)r(1− γ)], aR(γ¯)/µ = αb/[(1 + α)rγ¯ ] and
aR(γ)/µ =
α
1 + α
[b+ q(γ)c]/r
γ + q(γ)(1− γ) .
With q(γ) = 0, (41) simplifies to
[c
b
]1+α
≥
[
1/γ
]α − [1/γ¯]α
[1/(1− γ¯)]α − [1/(1− γ)]α
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As aR(γ) > aL(γ) for γ ∈ {γ, γ¯}, we must have c/b < (1 − γ¯)/γ¯, which leads to the
following necessary condition
1− γ¯
γ¯
≥
[
γ¯/γ
]α − 1
1− [(1− γ¯)/(1− γ)]α (42)
Denoting γ¯ = γ + k(1− γ) where k ∈ (0, 1) we have,[
γ¯/γ
]α − 1
1− [(1− γ¯)/(1− γ)]α =
[
1 + k(1− γ)/γ]α − 1
1− (1− k)α ≈
[
1 + k(1− γ)/γ]α − 1
1− (1− αk)
For α ≥ 1, we have[
1 + k(1− γ)/γ]α − 1
αk
≥ [1 + αk(1− γ)/γ]− 1
αk
=
1− γ
γ
>
1− γ¯
γ¯
For smaller α, using the L’Hospital rule, we have
lim
α→0
[
1 + k(1− γ)/γ]α − 1
αk
=
ln
[
1 + k(1− γ)/γ]
k
For γ close to γ¯ (hence, for low k, implying that k(1− γ)/γ is small), we have
ln
[
1 + k(1− γ)/γ]
k
≈ 1− γ
γ
>
1− γ¯
γ¯
For γ close to 0, we have
lim
γ→0
ln
[
1 + k(1− γ)/γ] /k = +∞
Hence, as ln
[
1 + k(1− γ)/γ] decreases with γ, we have ln [1 + k(1− γ)/γ] /k >
(1− γ¯)/γ¯. Consequently, condition (42) is violated, and thus (41) cannot be satisfied
with q(γ) = 0.
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Figure 1: Value of zero-coupon contingent claims
ZA and ZP are the values of the zero-coupon contingent claims A and P . When EBIT
flow a falls to threshold aR (a passage from above), A either pays x with probability
q and is worthless afterward, or it is transformed to claim P with probability 1 − q.
This latter either pays y at the first passage of a to aL from above and is worthless
afterward, or it is converted back to claim A at the first passage of a to aE from
below, whichever event occurs first.
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Figure 2: Ex ante and ex post equity values
If the bank accepts the renegotiation offer, the equity value jumps at aR from SA(aR)
to SP (aR). Then, it follows SP (at) until at reaches aE or falls to aL, in which case
the firm is liquidated.
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Figure 3: Bank debt value under renegotiation
Observe that the debt value crosses the liquidation value γa/µ twice. Renegotiation
is triggered when at falls to aR. Then the debt value equals the liquidation value
until at climbs to aE or falls to aL, in which case the firm is liquidated. The dashed
curve corresponds to the debt value when the bank always accepts to renegotiate
the debt service (relevant values are for a > a¯; for a ≤ a¯, it follows the firm’s
liquidation value). It meets the liquidation value tangentially at a¯, the corresponding
renegotiation threshold.
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